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PREEMPTING THE PEOPLE: THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN 
REGULATORY CONCURRENCY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 
POPULAR LAWMAKING 
THEODORE W. RUGER∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Larry Kramer and other legal scholars (many of them participants in 
this Symposium) are collectively responsible for the present flourishing of 
a mode of constitutional inquiry and analysis that is often called “popular 
constitutionalism.” In its standard forms, the study of popular constitution-
alism attempts to measure and describe—and sometimes to normatively 
promote—the role of the American people in framing the answers to basic 
interpretive questions about the Constitution’s meaning. Although the dis-
course in the field is often at a general level, looming in the background is 
usually a consideration of the people’s role in resolving specific constitu-
tional questions, such as the appropriate federal-state balance, the vague 
“equal protection” mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment, or the scope of 
the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment.1 
This essay explores a somewhat different conception of “the People’s” 
constitution, and one that is only indirectly connected to the specific resolu-
tion of concrete interpretive questions. My concern here is structural, fo-
cusing on particular features of lawmaking under the current federal regime 
 
 ∗ Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
 1. See, e.g., Saul Cornell, Mobs, Militias, and Magistrates: Popular Constitutionalism and the 
Whiskey Rebellion, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 883, 883–84 (2006) (“The role of the militia as an agent of 
popular constitutionalism . . . has been largely ignored in recent legal scholarship . . . . [and this] can be 
blamed in part on the ideological distortions wrought by modern Second Amendment scholarship which 
has obscured this important theme in early American constitutional discourse.”); Robert Post & Reva 
Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 
1039 (2004) (asserting that because, within the concept of popular constitutionalism, “nonjudicial actors 
retain the option of acting in defiance of law” when constitutional values are at stake, the proper bal-
ance between the Constitution and popular constitutionalism must be maintained); Robin West, Re-
sponse to State Action and a New Birth of Freedom, 92 GEO. L.J. 819, 829 (2004) (arguing that welfare 
rights “must be actualized through legislative action (through a ‘constitutionalized politics’) and not 
through adjudication (through a ‘constitutionalized law’)”); Robin West, Katrina, the Constitution, and 
the Legal Question Doctrine, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1127, 1129 (2006) (in arguing for constitutionally 
based welfare rights, exploring “the tension between . . . the state’s Constitutional obligations to the 
poor, and . . . that no American court will discover and then impose such Constitutional obligations 
upon recalcitrant state or federal legislators”). 
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of the United States that facilitate the public’s robust involvement in impor-
tant lawmaking choices. A central topographical feature of the nation’s 
regulatory landscape is the fact of concurrent federal and state jurisdiction: 
most fields of economic and social life are regulated by both federal and 
state laws. Although occasionally untidy and conflictual, this basic concur-
rency facilitates popular lawmaking by providing multiple outlets for pub-
lic preferences on important policy issues. The multiplicity of regulation 
also generates discourse, and in turn more public involvement, as the rules 
of various states and the federal government complement and conflict with 
each other.2 
This emphasis on concurrent jurisdiction—and its implications for 
popular sovereignty—runs counter to the prevailing emphasis among 
scholars of constitutional federalism over the past decade. In considering 
“federalism” questions in the past decade, legal scholars have devoted most 
attention to debates that are unquestionably important, but that are fought 
out at the margins of the regulatory arena—over those rare activities and 
areas of jurisdiction that, in the Supreme Court’s phrasing, are “truly na-
tional” or “truly local.”3 A central feature of the Supreme Court’s “new 
federalism” of the past decade has been a renewed inquiry into a narrow 
range of behaviors that are arguably under the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
federal government or the states. In advancing this project, the Court an-
nounced its own central role in policing the boundaries and outer limits of 
the federal structure, and so touched off ample debate, not just about the 
substantive divisions of American federalism, but also the appropriate judi-
cial role in enforcing these lines. Much of the academic debate on the 
Court’s authority implicates this boundary dispute, including the line of 
scholarship that examines (and these days, often critiques) the Court’s rela-
tive supremacy over the other branches of government.4 
For all the controversy about the outer limits of Congress’s power, 
however, the fact remains that Congress is free to regulate most spheres of 
interaction among Americans, as are the state governments. The vast ex-
pansion of the federal commerce power—which remains largely in place 
even after United States v. Morrison and United States v. Lopez5—has 
 
 2. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION (2005) (discussing popular opportunities for participation in lawmaking). 
 3. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995). 
 4. It appears that the Court itself has paid heed to the chorus of criticism of its new federalism 
jurisprudence, or has at least acted as if it has, by ruling in favor of national authority in several more 
recent cases. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2201 (2005) (upholding federal drug prohi-
bition against Commerce Clause challenge); Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 740 
(2003) (upholding Family and Medical Leave Act against Eleventh Amendment challenge). 
 5. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567–68. 
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taken place without automatic displacement of the states’ traditional police 
powers. The result is a vast sphere of concurrent regulatory authority that 
dwarfs the minor zones of “truly national” or “truly local” power that exist 
even after the Rehnquist Court’s slight expansion of the latter category. 
This fact of coexisting and overlapping jurisdiction produces a broad 
and multifaceted space for the public’s involvement in the lawmaking 
process, at least when compared to a more unitary national regime. And the 
public’s lawmaking arena is not simply divided in binary fashion, since 
both the national and state governments contain a variety of fora in which 
legal change can occur: legislatures, administrative bodies, local subdivi-
sions, judicial rulings, and jury verdicts. The viability of multiple outlets 
for lawmaking at multiple levels of government permits more of the peo-
ple, and different parts of the people, to have some voice in lawmaking 
choices. Because the mix of political interests, alignments, and opportuni-
ties will typically vary in different lawmaking fora, the variety of outlets 
for lawmaking will occasionally permit coalitions and groups that are los-
ers in the national setting to see their voices translated into positive law at 
the state level, or vice versa. As I describe below, it may be that in particu-
lar regulatory areas this multiplicity and variety produces undesirable costs 
and conflicts. But all else being (relatively) equal in terms of optimal policy 
choices, the federal structure with ample space for concurrent lawmaking 
generates an independent benefit related to the public’s greater involvement 
in lawmaking. 
This regulatory concurrency is a crucial part of the people’s constitu-
tion as it has come to develop, and it facilitates more and better public in-
volvement in important lawmaking areas. Against this backdrop, a judicial 
decision to make national power the exclusive font of authority in particu-
lar areas has important implications. A decision to completely preempt 
state law strips states of important features of their lawmaking sovereignty 
and, with it, strips the public of one key set of outlets for its lawmaking 
zeal. To be sure, the constitutional structure assumes that national rules 
occasionally can and will trump state law, and I do not argue here that 
Congress lacks the power to preempt across a wide swath of state regula-
tory subjects if it so chooses and sufficiently expresses intent to do so.6 But 
 
 6. Relatedly, I do not contest the power of federal courts to preempt state laws where a clear and 
irresolvable conflict exists with an act of Congress. Nor am I making a substantive judgment across 
disparate fields of regulatory policy that diversity and decentralization are always better than a uniform 
national rule, or evincing a particular concern for a form of state “sovereignty” that is distinct from the 
citizens residing therein. Like many other participants in this symposium, I am ultimately concerned 
with judicial power over the Constitution, and, in particular, the relationship of judicial authority to this 
architecture of concurrent jurisdiction, which is my topic here. 
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the power to preempt “the People” in the state lawmaking arena is most 
properly made by “the People” constituted nationally in Congress. Con-
striction of state lawmaking space is particularly problematic when effectu-
ated by unelected federal judges in matters where state and federal law do 
not expressly and obviously conflict. 
Much of my concern here touches on the role of the federal judiciary 
in promoting or corroding the dual lawmaking space of American federal-
ism, and, with it, the attendant normative virtues in terms of popular law-
making. Here, as in other areas of the people’s constitution, the Court has 
occupied a central role in defining the basic structure. But it has not been a 
simple story of judicial aggrandizement of power over the course of two 
centuries at the expense of the people’s authority. Just as the substantive 
role of the people and the political branches have waxed and (more re-
cently) waned relative to courts in the resolution of first-order debates over 
constitutional interpretation, so too have the contours of the public’s struc-
tural lawmaking space expanded and contracted over time.7 And just as 
with direct constitutional interpretation, the Supreme Court and other fed-
eral courts are key institutional actors in this story. Following a series of 
rulings in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that were either 
inconsistent or outright hostile to concurrent federal and state regulation, 
the Supreme Court embraced a set of interpretive norms that encouraged 
the dual structure of lawmaking and facilitated the public’s involvement at 
multiple levels of constitutional structure. At the same time that the Court 
was dramatically expanding both the scope and relative supremacy of its 
power within the field of constitutional law, it was expressly leaving space 
for greater popular involvement in important “ordinary” lawmaking in both 
the federal and state arenas. 
The Supreme Court and other federal courts today remain at the center 
of debates between multiplicity and concurrent authority, and uniformity 
and claims of preemption. The rules and presumptions that the Court has 
applied in mediating these disputes have varied over the past century are in 
some flux today, and have important implications vis-à-vis popular law-
making. Done right, the Court is sensitive to the popular lawmaking values 
inhering in a regime of concurrent jurisdiction, and adopts a restrained 
attitude toward preemption questions that requires express statements by 
Congress to preempt general state laws on the same subject. Done wrong, 
the Court imposes its own conception of legislative intent—often including 
an assertive preference for regulatory uniformity—to trump the operation 
 
 7. See infra Part I. 
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of ordinary politics at the state and federal levels. In the past decade, the 
Court has in several cases displayed a newfound skepticism toward the dual 
tiers of lawmaking and evinced a seeming preference for uniform national 
solutions.8 This trend, if advanced and continued, would significantly 
shrink the public’s lawmaking space, and it would substantially rework 
basic aspects of the New Deal compromise where the Supreme Court per-
mitted ample space for ordinary lawmaking. 
This essay proceeds in several parts. Part I describes some basic fea-
tures of the constitutional and ordinary lawmaking dynamics in the current 
political structure, with emphasis on the fact that as the Supreme Court has 
become more supreme with respect to constitutional law it has—since the 
New Deal—generally left ample space for the public and political branches 
to generate ordinary law across a range of subjects. Part II is a more de-
tailed discussion of the historical development of the concurrency principle 
as a matter of judicial doctrine and constitutional structure. Part III de-
scribes some of the normative virtues of the current dual regulatory frame-
work in terms of the public’s active involvement in the lawmaking process. 
I conclude with a cautionary note, discussing some recent decisions by the 
Supreme Court and other federal courts that suggest a judicial move away 
from the long prevailing embrace of concurrency in ordinary lawmaking, 
which potentially jeopardizes aspects of the public space described above. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT, THE JUDICIALIZED CONSTITUTION, AND SPACE 
FOR ORDINARY LAWMAKING 
Before returning to a more focused discussion of the concurrent aspect 
of ordinary lawmaking in the United States, a broader discussion of the 
related development of judicial power in constitutional law and ordinary 
law is warranted. This bifurcated legal structure turns on very different 
understandings of the authority of the people and the judiciary in constitu-
tional law and “ordinary” law.9 Much of the flourishing of what is gener-
ally called “popular constitutionalism” in legal academic discourse in the 
past decade is in response to two related features of increasing judicial 
power in the United States. Whether this robust judicial authority repre-
sents a gradual accretion of power or a stark newfound assertiveness of the 
 
 8. See infra Conclusion. 
 9. Note that some of what is doctrinally called “ordinary” or nonconstitutional law might be 
called constitutionalism by scholars such as Mark Tushnet and Reva Siegel. See e.g., Mark Tushnet, 
Popular Constitutionalism as Political Law, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 991, 993–94 (discussing the consti-
tutional law aspects of a proposed statute banning the use of torture to extract information about threats 
to national security). For my purposes here it suffices that much of what goes on in the “ordinary” 
lawmaking space is felt to be extremely important by the members of the public and officials involved. 
RUGER AUTHOR APPROVED EDITS 6-12-06 (H)(P) 9/18/2006  9:44:06 AM 
1034 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 81:1029 
Supreme Court in the past few decades is a matter of some debate, but vir-
tually all commentators agree that the courts—particularly the federal 
courts—exert significantly more authority over constitutional questions 
than they did at the time of the Framing. Part of this increase in authority 
resounds in judicial “supremacy”: the idea that courts are the final and most 
authoritative interpreter of constitutional meaning. Once a subject is “con-
stitutionalized” by the courts, the courts assert interpretive primacy, and the 
other branches and the public generally acquiesce in that claim.10 Coupled 
with this increased supremacy is a dramatic expansion of the scope of the 
judicialized constitution in terms of the subjects, activities, and entities that 
it covers. Not only are courts more supreme relative to other branches than 
they originally were, but the federal courts in the past half century have 
come to treat a variety of spheres of human endeavor as federal constitu-
tional questions that for most of United States history would have been 
regarded as outside that ambit. 
Both of these features of increased judicial power—supremacy and 
scope—are often discussed and rarely doubted as a basic descriptive mat-
ter. To be sure, one can find pockets of “departmentalism” rhetoric in the 
current constitutional discourse, particularly involving amorphous claims 
of Executive authority to interpret the Constitution in time of crisis.11 Other 
scholars rightly describe issues where the public itself is deeply involved in 
the framing of constitutional meaning, sometimes much more assiduously 
than the federal courts.12 But these are exceptions to the general norm of a 
polity where the judicialized constitution sweeps broadly and deeply into 
civic life, and where the courts possess interpretive supremacy as to the 
subjects within that sphere of reference. By any account, courts have gotten 
more powerful in the past two centuries—more supreme in interpreting the 
judicialized constitution, and also more voracious in terms of the range of 
aspects of human life that have been constitutionalized in the courts.13 
If we accept that this state of affairs represents a dramatic increase in 
federal judicial power over that provided by original understandings and 
 
 10. Examples of this phenomenon are myriad in recent decades, but one prominent exemplar is 
the opinion of the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores, which overruled Congress’s effort to 
interpret the Free Exercise clause in a manner different from the Court. 521 U.S. 507, 535–36 (1997). 
 11. For a prominent recent example, see Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney 
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Pat Roberts, Chairman, Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, et al. (Dec. 
22, 2005) (Dec. 22, 2005), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/fisa/nsaletter122205.pdf 
(describing President’s power to interpret the Constitution and conduct warrantless surveillance). 
 12. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Move-
ment Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 300–13 (2001) (describing the role of the women’s rights 
movement in the development of modern sex discrimination jurisprudence). 
 13. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). 
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practices—and it is hard not to come to that conclusion—it bears asking 
why the public and the elected branches of government have been generally 
willing to permit this marked accretion of judicial power. Part of the an-
swer is a dreary one, grounded in the gradual disconnection of citizens 
from their government generally, and in the collectivization and bureaucra-
tization of political parties and civic institutions. To paraphrase Larry 
Kramer, this is a story about “politics mov[ing] indoors,” at significant cost 
to the breadth and richness of public discourse about constitutional sub-
jects.14 
Another answer, not incompatible with the first but grounded in a very 
different dynamic, however, is that the people largely ceded constitutional 
discourse to the courts because of the rising interest in, and importance of, 
ordinary subconstitutional law. If the story of the past two centuries is one 
of increased judicial authority over the Constitution, it is also a story of 
vast increase, particularly since the New Deal, in the scope and importance 
of “ordinary” positive law in people’s lives. A host of crucial subjects—
from health care to retirement security to employment relationships to con-
sumer transactions—are now regulated not primarily by private ordering 
but by positive law and regulation, in ways that would have been incon-
ceivable even a century ago. This ordinary law is not only pervasive, but 
also important. Polls suggest that these areas of law are more salient to 
members of the public than textbook constitutional law questions. For in-
stance, in several recent opinion polls many more American considered 
issues including “unemployment/jobs,” the “economy,” war with Iraq, 
poverty and homelessness, and health care as the most pressing issues fac-
ing the nation than did the fewer than the 2.5% who considered judges, 
laws, and courts as most important.15 All of this suggests a different expla-
nation for the public’s seeming concession of constitutional supremacy to 
the courts: the public’s interest has moved on to other topics of more im-
mediate concern, like health care, employment rights, social security, and 
physical safety. 
This shift in emphasis has important implications for popular lawmak-
ing. Because the Constitution’s expansion has largely coexisted with the 
expansion of ordinary law, ample public outlets for lawmaking remain 
despite the courts’ appropriation of most of constitutional interpretation. 
The modes of lawmaking, and the public’s role therein, differ dramatically 
 
 14. Larry Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
4, 104 (2001). 
 15. See Gallup Poll Social Series: Mood of the Nation, Question 5 (field date Jan. 3–5, 2005) (on 
file with author); Gallup Poll Social Series: Governance, Question 5 (field date Sept. 12–15, 2005) (on 
file with author). 
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between these two basic spheres of law. Moreover, the coexistence of these 
two alternative spheres represents a kind of implicit (and occasionally ex-
press) structural compromise among courts and other branches of govern-
ment and the public at large. 
But courts have a special primacy among actors in this bifurcated re-
gime, operating not merely within the confines of constitutional law but 
also playing two leading roles relative to “ordinary” or subconstitutional 
law. First, the Supreme Court and other federal courts police the crucial 
line of demarcation between constitutional law and ordinary law. Because 
the Constitution trumps ordinary law, and because courts possess interpre-
tive supremacy not just over the meaning of constitutional law but also 
over the breadth of its coverage, the Supreme Court can effectively dimin-
ish the realm of ordinary law by constitutionalizing new portions of that 
sphere. 
Second, courts exercise interpretive authority within the sphere of or-
dinary law, construing statutes and mediating actual or perceived conflicts 
between state and federal laws. A court’s interpretation of a federal statute 
is, to be sure, subject to “departmental” override to a degree not seen in the 
constitutional context. Congress (with the President’s signature) can, and 
occasionally does, correct or modify judicial interpretations of its statutes. 
But this corrective lawmaking process is difficult and often highly contin-
gent on institutional barriers, such that judicial interpretation of “ordinary 
law” is more durable and influential than often described as a formal mat-
ter. At the very least, the Supreme Court and other federal courts have the 
power to fundamentally shift the baseline valence of federal statutory 
schemes in ways that may not be susceptible to Congressional modifica-
tion. 
How has the Supreme Court facilitated—even promoted—the growth 
of the public’s ordinary lawmaking space even as it has appropriated for 
itself supremacy over constitutional law questions? The Court has several 
mechanisms in constitutional text and doctrine through which to delimit the 
boundaries between constitutional law and ordinary law, and its construc-
tion of these doctrinal levers serves to expand or restrict the space open for 
popular ordinary lawmaking on important subjects. So accepted are most of 
these doctrines that they are rarely discussed, but each represents a choice 
that was debatable at the time originally made.16 In most cases, both in the 
 
 16. These available doctrinal levers include judicial application of the taxing power, the spending 
power, and the commerce clause authority. For representative discussions about the manner in which 
the New Deal-era Supreme Court relaxed judicial scrutiny of all of these powers in a manner that 
facilitated the expansion of federal ordinary law, see, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Constitutional Limits on the 
Taxing Power of the Federal Government, 41 TAX LAW. 3, 4 (1987) (discussing the prevailing modern 
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nineteenth century and from the New Deal forward (with a brief period of 
exception in between) the Supreme Court chose the path that avoided insti-
tutional conflict and facilitated the construction of ordinary law. The Court 
has, in general, chosen to encourage the expansion of ordinary lawmaking, 
even as it has expanded its own authority within the sphere of the judicial-
ized constitution. For instance, the Court has rarely enforced limits on the 
taxing and spending powers, two related provisions that some early leaders 
thought had meaningful boundaries that operated to constrain federal au-
thority. In 1817, President James Madison vetoed a federal statute appro-
priating funds on the grounds that it exceeded the scope of the spending 
power and thus could not be reconciled with the Constitution.17 But the 
Supreme Court never adopted Madison’s parsimonious formulation of the 
spending power, and this permissive construction is a crucial foundation on 
which the large modern national government rests.18 That the basic spend-
ing discretion is rarely debated today only underscores how long, and how 
consistently, the Supreme Court has refused to stretch that doctrinal lever 
to meddle with ordinary public policy spending by Congress. 
Relatedly, the Supreme Court’s consistently broad construction of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause,19 and the generally weak link required be-
tween legislative means and ends, are important foundations for the growth 
of positive ordinary law and doctrinal choices that were by no means un-
controversial. In various periods, particularly around the turn of the twenti-
eth century, the Court applied these doctrinal mechanisms more strictly at 
considerable cost to the viability of state and federal legislation.20 
 
“view of federal taxation as virtually immune to any constitutional restrictions”); Barry Cushman, 
Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1150 (2000) 
(explaining the path of the Supreme Court’s New Deal-era commerce clause jurisprudence, culminating 
in “[t]he Court’s decision to abandon judicially-enforced limitations on the commerce power”); David 
E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1 (1994) (describing the evolution of the Supreme 
Court’s spending clause jurisprudence through the New Deal era); Howard Gillman, Disaster Relief, 
“Do Anything” Spending Powers, and the New Deal, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 443, 444 (2005) (Justice 
Stone’s dissenting conception of a “do anything” spending power was endorsed by the late New Deal 
Court.); Gale Ann Norton, The Limitless Federal Taxing Power, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 591, 591 
(1985) (“Courts overwhelmingly rely upon democratic institutions to remedy abuses in taxation, rather 
than exercising a strong hand in judicial review.”). 
 17. See JAMES MADISON, VETO MESSAGE (1817), reprinted in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1897, at 584 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896). 
Madison vetoed a commerce clause based spending bill “for constructing roads and canals, and improv-
ing the navigation of water courses,” noting that he was “constrained by the insuperable difficulty [he 
felt] in reconciling the bill with the Constitution” to veto it. 
 18. For a comprehensive history and analysis of the Supreme Court’s spending power jurispru-
dence, see generally Engdahl, supra note 16. 
 19. See M’Cullogh v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411–23 (1819). 
 20. See generally Barry Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism, 85 B.U. L. 
REV. 881 (2005) (describing Lochner-era judicial scrutiny of ordinary remedial legislation). 
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Consideration of all of these doctrinal choices by the Court suggests 
an institution willing to allow the wide expansion of ordinary lawmaking, 
federal spending, and regulation that occurred in the twentieth century. And 
this expansion of the ordinary lawmaking sphere happened alongside a 
growth in the Court’s authority and breath over the judicialized constitu-
tion. Put differently, the growth of constitutional law and the Court’s au-
thority within it did not produce a zero-sum result. Instead, as the public 
and political institutions lost influence in the sphere of constitutional law, 
they found greater freedom to assert and codify policy preferences in the 
sphere of ordinary lawmaking. That some of this “ordinary” lawmaking 
was extraordinary in scope and importance—for instance, the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and the implementation of Social Security and Medicare—
only underscores that much of the public’s constitutional impulse was 
transferred to, and found outlet in, the forms of so-called ordinary law. 
The above discussion about the growth of ordinary law applies pri-
marily to the national government’s expansion, and so another question to 
which I now turn involves the impact of national regulatory growth on the 
remaining authority of the state governments. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S ROLE IN PERMITTING AND MAINTAINING 
CONCURRENT REGULATORY JURISDICTION 
As I have noted above, my subject here involves the multiple spaces in 
the constitutional structure where popular lawmaking occurs, but it is also 
centered on the role of the Supreme Court and other federal courts in creat-
ing and preserving this structure. From the Marshall Court era forward, the 
Supreme Court has been a crucial institutional actor in framing the concur-
rency principle, and historically has shown some inconsistency in its em-
brace of concurrent jurisdiction as opposed to a more exclusive national 
regime. The story that follows is an abbreviated version of this doctrinal 
path, focusing on key moments and turning points in the historical devel-
opment. In this area, as in other aspects of the structural contours of ordi-
nary lawmaking, decisions by the Court were crucial to preserving space 
for state laws to exist concurrently with federal regulations. 
The Supreme Court’s central role in framing the structure of concur-
rent lawmaking arises in large part from the Constitution’s ambiguity on 
the subject. Much of the Constitution, both in generative intent and in tex-
tual specificity, contains indications of a desire to dampen the scope of 
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state authority.21 The text provides for uniform and exclusive areas of fed-
eral regulation, and prohibits the states from engaging in certain kinds of 
regulatory activities. On the other hand, the extremely limited conception 
of the original federal government, and the parts of the Constitution that 
presume state retention of general police power authority, underscore the 
basic understanding that much—if not most—regulation of economic and 
social life would remain with the states. 
This original allocation of authority, coupled with the parsimonious 
scope of regulation at both the state and federal levels two centuries ago, 
dramatically minimized the potential for, and actuality of, concurrency and 
conflict in the earliest decades of the United States government. Because 
both regulatory spheres were significantly smaller in scope and the few 
areas of federal power were specified (and often made expressly exclusive) 
in the Constitution’s text, overlap was rare and jurisdictional conflict rarer 
still. Even in the early nineteenth century, however, and dramatically so in 
the twentieth century, expansion of the more ambiguous federal Commerce 
Clause power resulted in new questions about the ability of state law to 
coexist with new assertions of federal authority. The Court confronted this 
question repeatedly in the nineteenth century, and did so in some of its 
leading cases of the era, including an initial treatment in Gibbons v. 
Ogden.22 
The primary importance of Gibbons, both at the time of the decision 
and now, relates to the case’s generative function in establishing the basic 
authority of Congress to regulate commerce among the states. By opting 
for a (slightly) broader conception of Congressional commerce power than 
some contemporaries advocated, the case was an important building block 
for national authority in the nineteenth century and beyond. But this rela-
tively expansive reading of the federal commerce power necessarily pro-
duced a subsidiary inquiry that is more relevant here. The back story to 
Gibbons—and one hotly debated by the parties and Justices—involved the 
implication of the Court’s somewhat generous reading of the federal com-
merce power for state laws touching on the same kind of activity. Would a 
finding of federal jurisdiction operate automatically to oust the states from 
this regulatory field? Or could the two sovereigns regulate the same or 
related activities so long as the specific legal commands did not conflict? 
Precisely because much of the Constitution’s specific textual allocation of 
 
 21. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 506–18 
(1969); Jack N. Rakove, The Madisonian Moment, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 473, 496–505 (1988). 
 22. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197–211 (1824). 
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authority appeared exclusive as to specific areas (e.g., bankruptcy), the text 
provided little guidance on this important commerce clause question. 
Many at the time, including Justice Johnson in concurrence, embraced 
a theory of mutually exclusive regulatory jurisdiction: once it was estab-
lished that a type of economic activity was within the bounds of Congres-
sional commerce power, it was necessarily outside the states’ regulatory 
jurisdiction. Interpreting the Constitution’s grant of power to Congress, 
Johnson wrote that “[t]he inferences, to be correctly drawn, from this whole 
article, appear to me to be altogether in favour of the exclusive grants to 
Congress of power over commerce . . . .”23 Because he agreed with the 
Court’s finding that the federal commerce power extended to the regulation 
of interstate steamship travel, Johnson’s path to the ultimate result was 
straight and simple: the grant of federal power automatically ousted the 
states, and so the New York statute granting rights to Fulton and Livingston 
was ultra vires and void.24 
Writing for the Court, however, Chief Justice John Marshall articu-
lated a more nuanced view of the interaction of federal and state regulatory 
authority that allowed the possibility of some overlap. Like Johnson, Mar-
shall agreed that the federal commerce authority extended to the steamship 
activity at issue in the case, and so the 1793 federal law under which Gib-
bons’s ferries were licensed as “vessels employed in the coasting trade” 
was validly enacted and substantively controlling.25 But Marshall did not 
regard the Constitution’s grant of power, and the subsequent legislative 
exercise of it, as necessarily preclusive of state regulation. He recognized 
that sometimes, “in exercising the power of regulating their own purely 
internal affairs,” states might occasionally enact laws that touched on the 
same subjects as federal statutes.26 But such concurrency did not render the 
state law per se invalid: instead Marshall proposed an inquiry that appears 
very much like modern conflict preemption analysis. In a zone of concur-
rent regulation, “the validity of [state laws] depends on their interfering 
with, and being contrary to, an act of Congress . . . .”27 Where such direct 
interference existed, the state laws would be invalid, but absent that con-
flict, coexistence was possible. For Marshall, the possibility of concurrent 
regulation required a secondary judicial inquiry into whether “in their ap-
plication” the state laws had “come into collision with an act of Con-
 
 23. Id. at 236 (Johnson, J., concurring). 
 24. See id. 
 25. Id. at 212 (majority opinion). 
 26. Id. at 209–10. 
 27. Id. 
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gress.”28 But only where such actual “collision” existed would states be 
ousted from their regulatory position, even when Congress also regulated in 
the area. As the numerosity and breadth of federal laws expanded dramati-
cally a century after Gibbons, this nuanced concurrency/conflict position 
would be tested and debated by later Justices, and would ultimately become 
essential for the simultaneous growth of federal and state lawmaking dur-
ing the twentieth century. 
Before then, however, the Court would revisit the terms of debate be-
tween Johnson and Marshall on several occasions during the nineteenth 
century. During this period the Court’s attitude was characterized as much 
by a continuing dissensus among various different Justices as by any clear 
resolution of the conflict. I will not recount in detail every instance of this 
exclusivity/concurrency debate as it appeared in cases during the 1800s, but 
I will note some of the more prominent explications of both sides. In this 
summary I rely heavily on Stephen Gardbaum’s detailed exploration of the 
Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence during this era.29 
After the Gibbons debate the same dissensus reappeared a decade later 
in the case of Houston v. Moore,30 which considered the impact of a state 
law imposing penalties upon state militiamen who refuse to serve when 
called into active duty by the President, despite federal authority to organ-
ize the militia in the first place. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Story 
opted for the Marshall position of potentially concurrent regulation, stating 
that a federal statute would have preemptive effect only in instances of 
“direct repugnancy or incompatibility” with a state law. Absent a Constitu-
tional expression of exclusivity (as with bankruptcy or coinage), or a “di-
rect and manifest collision” between state and federal statutes, to Story “it 
seem[ed] unquestionable that the States retain concurrent authority with 
Congress.”31 Reflecting the disagreement that prevailed on this question in 
the era, however, Justice Washington, in his majority opinion, denounced 
as a “novel and unconstitutional doctrine” the idea that “[s]tate govern-
ments have a concurrent power of legislation” that may be exercised so 
long as the state and national laws are not “contradictory and repugnant to 
each other.”32 Looking just to these two opinions, the clear dichotomy that 
would continue throughout much of the nineteenth century is revealed. 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 787–800 
(1994). 
 30. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 12 (1820). 
 31. Id. at 49–50 (Story, J., dissenting). 
 32. Id. at 24 (majority opinion). Justice Johnson concurred in Houston and expressed a view 
similar to the Marshall/Story concurrency position. Though stressing that federal law would be supreme 
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Even Justice Story himself seemed internally undecided on the ques-
tion. After his endorsement of concurrent jurisdiction in Houston, he did an 
about face and reversed his own view in the later case of Prigg v Pennsyl-
vania.33 Story’s Prigg opinion articulated a strong view of complete field 
preemption once Congress had legislated in an area. He wrote that valid 
federal enactments 
the legislation of Congress, in what it does prescribe, manifestly indi-
cates that it does not intend that there shall be any farther legislation to 
act upon the subject-matter. Its silence as to what it does not do, is as ex-
pressive of what its intention is as the direct provisions made by it.34 
Despite Justice Story’s defection, the doctrine of concurrency received 
important support from the Court in the 1851 case of Cooley v. Board of 
Wardens.35 There a Pennsylvania statute requiring local pilots on all ships 
using the port of Philadelphia was challenged as unconstitutionally invad-
ing the federal commerce power. The Court declined to invalidate the state 
law on exclusivity grounds, and in so doing expressly endorsed the princi-
ple of concurrent regulation. Justice Curtis, writing for the Court, stated 
that the Pennsylvania law was valid so long as “it is not in conflict with any 
law of Congress” and “does not interfere with any system which Congress 
has established by making regulations.”36 
As the nineteenth century ended, the debate between exclusive and 
concurrent conceptions of state and federal regulatory authority remained 
unsettled but by and large unimportant. So long as both the federal and 
state governments’ regulatory sweep was relatively limited in scope, the 
areas of overlap that implicated the exclusivity/concurrency debate were 
few in number. This rarity of overlap would change around the turn of the 
century and reach dramatic proportions a few decades later. As Progres-
sives and New Deal reformers sought positive legal change, often in the 
form of new regulatory statutes, and advanced their agenda both in Wash-
ington, D.C. and in various state capitals, increased friction between state 
and federal regulatory regimes forced the question of exclusivity before the 
Supreme Court again, in much more salient form. 
Surprisingly, from a modern vantage point, the Court’s initial resolu-
tion of the issue in the early twentieth century favored a strong federal ex-
 
and preemptive in areas where state laws “[ran] counter to the laws of Congress,” he adamantly op-
posed “the exploded doctrine, that within the scope in which Congress may legislate, the States shall 
not legislate.” Id. at 45 (Story, J., concurring). 
 33. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 617–18 (1842). 
 34. Id. at 618. 
 35. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318–21 (1851). 
 36. Id. at 321. 
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clusivity position. In a series of cases in the first decades of the century, the 
Court promulgated an idea of “latent exclusivity” that provided that any 
Congressional action at all in a given regulatory field completely ousted the 
states from that area of regulation. This ouster occurred automatically in 
the wake of Congressional action—regardless of whether the federal and 
state laws were actually in conflict. Justice McKenna expressed this new 
view in characteristic language in the case of Southern Railway Co. v. 
Reid,37 which raised the issue of whether a North Carolina statute requiring 
railroad companies to transport tendered freight could coexist with the fed-
eral Interstate Commerce Act (“ICA”). Without any inquiry into actual 
conflict, the Court ruled that by passing the ICA the Congress had “taken 
possession of the field” of railroad regulation.38 The states were thus ousted 
from the area even if their laws did not produce actual or implied conflict. 
Justice McKenna wrote that “[i]t is well settled that if the State and Con-
gress have a concurrent power, that of the State is superseded when the 
power of Congress is exercised.”39 In another representative case of the era, 
Chief Justice White gave voice to an even more absolute version of this 
exclusivity rule, holding that “it must follow . . . that the power of the State 
over the subject-matter ceased to exist from the moment that Congress 
exerted its paramount and all embracing authority over the subject.”40 
Given the broad tendency of this doctrine to override entire areas of 
state remedial legislation, it is possible to regard the latent exclusivity doc-
trine as part of a bundle of doctrines the Court applied in cases like 
Lochner v. New York41 to invalidate state remedial laws on various 
grounds. But perhaps surprisingly, this exclusivity position also attracted 
the endorsement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who dissented in 
Lochner and some of the Supreme Court’s other similar decisions of the 
time. Holmes had no problem, however, agreeing with his brethren on the 
idea of latent exclusivity, with the result that he joined and wrote opinions 
that were effectively hostile to entire schemes of state regulation. In the 
1915 case of Charleston & Western Carolina Railway Co. v. Varnville 
Furniture Co.,42 Justice Holmes described his version of the new exclusiv-
ity analysis. He wrote that the existence of actual conflict was not neces-
sary to supersede state law, explaining that the alleged absence of conflict 
 
 37. 222 U.S. 424, 431 (1912). 
 38. Id. at 442. 
 39. Id. at 436. 
 40. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Hardwick Farmers Elevator Co., 226 U.S. 426, 435 
(1913). 
 41. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 42. 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915). 
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is immaterial. “When Congress has taken the particular subject-matter in 
hand coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a state law is not to be 
declared a help because it attempts to go farther than Congress has seen fit 
to go.”43 
Before turning to the New Deal’s modification of this doctrine, it is in-
teresting to pause here and consider how different the structure of popular 
lawmaking would be if this latent exclusivity doctrine remained the law of 
the land during and after the New Deal’s vast expansion of federal legisla-
tion. Consider the expansive conception of federal field preemption articu-
lated by Chief Justice White and quoted above: “[T]he power of the State 
over the subject-matter ceased to exist from the moment that Congress 
exerted its paramount and all embracing authority over the subject.”44 The 
breadth of this principle is striking, and so too is its radical departure from 
current ideas of overlapping regulatory jurisdiction. Under this exclusivity 
framework, the later twentieth century would have developed with dra-
matically less state law, since every new federal lawmaking initiative 
would have necessarily jettisoned states from that field. This dynamic 
would, I suspect, have significantly curtailed federal lawmaking as well, 
since the implications of new acts of Congress in terms of superseding state 
power would have been vastly greater, and with this great cost would have 
come more reluctance to legislate. In sum, the regulatory landscape would 
have been almost unrecognizable to anyone who studies or practices within 
the regime of concurrent jurisdiction that prevails today. Furthermore, for 
reasons discussed in the following section, the unitary and zero-sum nature 
of this exclusive regulatory framework may have produced undesirable 
procedural effects on the public’s participation in lawmaking because 
groups with power in Washington could effectively trump all lawmaking 
on a subject by inducing Congressional action. 
All of this, of course, is mere speculation. The Supreme Court did not 
hold fast to its doctrine of latent exclusivity as the twentieth century pro-
gressed, and by midcentury had changed its basic rule to permit substantial 
concurrency in regulation. The Court’s change in course on this issue can 
be regarded as part of its larger New Deal compromise that entailed a 
broadened conception of the federal Commerce Clause and other necessary 
preconditions for robust ordinary lawmaking. At the same time that the 
Supreme Court would begin to assert unprecedented authority over the 
breadth and definition of constitutional rules, it framed many of the Consti-
tution’s basic structural provisions in a manner that allowed the political 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 226 U.S. at 435. 
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branches and the public unprecedented latitude to engage in other kinds of 
lawmaking. The Justices must have sensed the dire implications for state 
law of their newly permissive attitude toward Congressional regulation if 
the latent exclusivity doctrine persisted. By returning to a preemptive ra-
tionale grounded in the existence of actual conflict, the Court helped frame 
the regulatory architecture of the rest of the twentieth century, and with it 
preserved multiple spaces for popular lawmaking. 
The specific method by which the Court disavowed its latent exclusiv-
ity jurisprudence took the form of several cases in the New Deal era and 
just afterward. The leading explications are in Mintz v. Baldwin,45 a 1933 
case, and Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,46 a 1947 case. The move away 
from the exclusivity idea was evident in Mintz, which involved overlap-
ping—but not conflicting—state and federal laws to prevent infectious 
cattle diseases. The Supreme Court found no conflict and therefore no pre-
emption, and introduced a new clear statement rule focused on Congres-
sional intent, stating that “[t]he purpose of Congress to supersede or 
exclude state action . . . is not lightly to be inferred,” and to trump state 
law, an “intention so to do must definitely and clearly appear [in the stat-
ute].”47 The same idea was maintained and expanded a decade later in Rice, 
with an explicit nod to the federalism concerns that justified a move away 
from the exclusivity doctrine. Justice Douglas wrote that “Congress legis-
lated here in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,” which 
compelled the initial “assumption that the historic police powers of the 
States were not to be superseded by [federal statute] unless that was the 
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”48 
With these cases and others establishing that state and federal regula-
tion on the same subjects could and would coexist, the path was cleared for 
the significant growth of both state and federal lawmaking in the second 
half of the century, and with that shift came multiple avenues for various 
parts of the public to participate in the framing of such laws. The midcen-
tury doctrine represents something both old and new. On one hand, the 
embrace of concurrency and the search for actual conflict resembles the 
original view of John Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden that vied for predomi-
nance on the Supreme Court throughout the nineteenth century. But the 
New Deal Court’s emphasis on Congressional clear statement reflected a 
new institutional sensitivity. The Court properly recognized that a judicial 
 
 45. 289 U.S. 346, 350–52 (1933). 
 46. 331 U.S. 218, 229–36 (1947). 
 47. Mintz, 289 U.S. at 350. 
 48. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230. 
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construction of a federal statute’s preemptive force by implication corroded 
the political process in the states and truncated the breadth of the people’s 
lawmaking space. By forcing Congress to speak clearly to supersede state 
laws, the Court ensured that the public as constituted nationally in Con-
gress would be the institution to trump the public in the states where appro-
priate. 
III. CONCURRENCY AND THE MULTIPLE SPACES FOR POPULAR 
LAWMAKING 
The end result of the Supreme Court’s doctrinal shift described above 
is that the expansion of positive and administrative lawmaking at the fed-
eral level in the early- and mid-twentieth century has, by and large, not 
displaced state lawmaking on similar subjects. Federal involvement in a 
particular area is not a zero-sum game, automatically displacing state law-
making in fields where it occurs. Nor has state lawmaking ossified since 
the New Deal for other reasons. In many areas, such as health care, em-
ployment, and education, for instance, the expansion of state regulation and 
administrative form in the past half century have rivaled the federal gov-
ernment in scope and diversity of coverage. Even in an era of judicial su-
premacy over most constitutional law, meaningful ordinary lawmaking—
and the public’s participation therein—has flourished in a manner not gen-
erally seen in the nineteenth century. 
My focus in this essay is on the public’s involvement in these impor-
tant areas of lawmaking and on the salutary effect that the concurrent regu-
latory architecture of the United States has on the extent and variety of this 
involvement. I will return to that feature of the concurrency idea, but I will 
first treat a few other aspects of this federal structure that are of tangential 
concern. 
One justification that is commonly given to support decentralized fed-
eralism in the United States is utilitarian in nature, and grounded in the 
assumption that even in 2006 there exist regional or state differences 
among Americans in various policy fields. So, for instance, Larry Kramer 
has argued elsewhere that “[t]he whole point of federalism . . . is that, be-
cause preferences for governmental policy are unevenly distributed among 
the states and regions of the nation, more people can be satisfied by decen-
tralized decisionmaking.”49 My colleague Seth Kreimer has expressed a 
 
 49. Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 215, 222 (2000). See also Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal 
Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 536–37 (1997) (supporting 
decentralization in environmental policy to accommodate different preferences); Ernest A. Young, The 
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similar point in more specified language, maintaining that “the lesbian who 
finds herself in Utah, like the gun lover who lives in Washington, D.C., and 
the gambler in Pennsylvania, need only cross a state border to be free of 
constraining rules.”50 If the preferences of residents in different states vary 
significantly, and if policy choices in given subjects do not generate dra-
matic externalities, the argument goes, utility is optimized by permitting 
each state’s citizens to select the policy options that best fit their collective 
preferences. I do not dispute this justification for state-by-state lawmaking, 
and in many areas it complements this essay’s emphasis on the participa-
tion of the public in various states in the lawmaking enterprise. But this 
preference-specification rationale emphasizes something different than the 
actual lawmaking process, and so is not directly implicated in the discus-
sion here. It would be possible, for instance, to achieve much of the prefer-
ence optimization that occurs in a federal system through a single uniform 
government with regional branch offices and decentralized variation in 
rules. This kind of regional variation to comport with local preferences 
occurs today among some United States government entities, such as the 
practice of various U.S. Attorney’s offices in tailoring prosecution choices 
in accordance with regional norms.51 But this kind of single-sovereign 
decentralization fails to capture the participatory benefits of the concurrent 
lawmaking structure actually in place in the United States. If the concern is 
the people’s involvement in the creation and operation of law, the multiple 
outlets and forms of lawmaking that exist in a dual sovereignty system 
provide a distinct procedural advantage that has little to do with substantive 
preference optimization. 
Similarly, I recognize but do not necessarily endorse another justifica-
tion occasionally proffered for a dual sovereignty regime: the idea that the 
public will feel more connected to local and state governments than to 
Washington, D.C., and thus will feel more able to influence and participate 
in state lawmaking initiatives.52 There is something to this claim, both con-
ceptually and empirically, and one can think of instances where reasons of 
proximity and affinity make the state government a more accessible outlet 
for public lawmaking zeal than Congress or other parts of the federal gov-
 
Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 54 (2004) (describing the preference-
maximizing benefits of decentralized federalism). 
 50. Seth F. Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Mar. 2001, 
at 66, 72. 
 51. An insight I gained working in the Saint Louis U.S. Attorney’s Office. 
 52. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) (describing accountability 
benefits from federalism because “state governments remain responsive to the local electorate’s prefer-
ences” and “state officials remain accountable to the people”). 
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ernment. But I am willing to be somewhat agnostic about which venue—
the state or national polity—is characteristically more open to input and 
participation from various segments of the interested public. Certainly there 
are prominent examples of national lawmaking—the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, for instance—where a process national in scope was necessary to 
trump entrenched interests in many state capitols and make a broader set of 
voices heard. 
One need not select a single preferred forum, however, to recognize 
the general benefits of concurrent jurisdiction for popular participation in 
the lawmaking process. The real benefits of concurrent jurisdiction are 
produced by the multiplicity itself, together with the fact that the various 
states and federal government vary in terms of the particular interest group 
matrix, office holder characteristics, and procedural format for lawmaking. 
These differences may produce meaningful variation in the ability of dif-
ferent subgroups of the people to translate their preferences into positive 
law reform. If we accept the obvious fact that “the People” do not exist in 
undifferentiated form, but rather are segmented by party, region, and spe-
cific interest group, it follows that some groups of the people who have 
little or no meaningful voice in one set of lawmaking institutions might 
have substantive input in a different forum. The losers in one forum (state 
or federal) may be able to resort to the other forum to have their views at 
least partially translated into policy. 
Nor, given institutional complexity at both the federal and state level, 
are there only two binary outlets for this kind of popular lawmaking. 
Within each state and within the federal system, multiple institutions inter-
act to form policy outcomes. Legislatures, agencies, juries, and judges all 
shape regulatory policy, either collectively or (more often) sequentially and 
responsively. Even at the same level of the federal system, different oppor-
tunities exist for public participation that vary in important ways. 
This horizontal dynamic of the concurrent regulatory framework is il-
lustrated by the role of the civil jury. When mainstream constitutional law 
scholars discuss jury decision making today, it is to a great extent as an 
historical artifact of a bygone populist era. Around the time of the Framing, 
citizens serving on juries could and did play an active role in shaping and 
applying constitutional rules, and the jury was recognized as an important 
outlet of popular constitutionalism.53 But as nineteenth-century courts ex-
 
 53. See Michael Kent Curtis, Judicial Review and Populism, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 313, 345–
46 (2003) (quoting De Tocqueville and others on the “democratic character” of the American jury); H. 
Jefferson Powell, The Principles of ‘98: An Essay in Historical Retrieval, 80 VA. L. REV. 689, 740 
(1994) (describing early theory of multimodal constitutional interpretation, which included juries as 
important interpreters). 
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erted more assertive control of legal doctrine—both constitutional and oth-
erwise—the idea of a jury as a substantive constitutional policymaker be-
came greatly diminished. To the extent the judicial branch came to assert 
supremacy over constitutional interpretation, it was emphatically the legal 
role of the judges, not juries, that was exalted. 
Just as nineteenth-century judges displaced the jury in constitutional 
interpretation, so too did the judiciary, over the same period, largely evis-
cerate the jury as a policymaking institution in the fields of “ordinary” law: 
tort, contract, and property rights. As Morton Horwitz describes, nine-
teenth-century courts assiduously sought to leverage control of ordinary 
law away from popular outlets like juries and legislatures, and successfully 
did so by promulgating a new set of judicialized doctrines and decision 
rules.54 
It is here that the concurrency principle, applied since the New Deal, 
has operated powerfully not just to permit dual outlets for ordinary law-
making, but also to bring the jury back in as a meaningful outlet for popular 
sentiment. The New Deal revolution’s focus on legislative and administra-
tive solutions to crucial problems might have signaled a further reduction 
of the role of the jury—even beyond the judicial curtailment that had taken 
place in the previous hundred years. But such has not been the result of the 
twentieth century’s expansion of positive law. Instead, the federal courts’ 
generally permissive attitude toward concurrency has resulted not just in 
space remaining for state positive lawmaking, but also for popular outlets 
in common law. At the same time, state judiciaries in the past half century 
have relaxed the nineteenth-century doctrines sufficiently to let the jury 
back into lawmaking. Public attitudes toward health care arrangements, 
corporate power, and employment disputes that are muted or unheard in the 
ordinary legislative process are occasionally filtered through and given 
voice in jury verdicts, particularly so in cases with impact that resonates 
more broadly.55 
It bears repeating that this multiplicity and diversity of form in law-
making entails costs as well as benefits, and in particular areas the conflict-
 
 54. See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860 
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ing impulses of multiple layers of regulation and decentralized jury verdicts 
may produce unworkable results that will demand national correction. Ba-
sic supremacy principles empower Congress to impose such a uniform 
solution—and selectively to trump inconsistent state laws—where it de-
cides to do so. Although potentially burdensome, even this process of 
working out inconsistency produces ancillary discursive benefits as various 
public and private actors discuss and debate the optimal regulatory strategy. 
When multiplicity is presumed, by the time pressure for a uniform national 
solution reaches its height, various states undoubtedly will have imple-
mented different kinds of regulatory strategies, permitting some empirical 
analysis of the optimal uniform solution to impose. The process of finaliz-
ing the national rule will once again often involve public debate and oppor-
tunity for public participation. 
In sum, there is a distinct procedural advantage to the ex ante pre-
sumption of concurrent regulatory jurisdiction, with the corollary fact of 
multiple outlets for public involvement. This multifaceted process is part of 
the People’s constitution as much as other more specific doctrines or prac-
tices. The fact of concurrency represents a conscious structural choice 
made by judges and other officials in the past, and reaffirmed in the past 
half century of jurisprudence and regulatory practice. Precisely because this 
multilayered process is an important part of the public’s Constitution, it is 
important that decisions to constrict the spaces for public lawmaking—by 
moving toward a uniform national policy in a given area—be made by the 
people themselves as constituted in the national Congress, rather than by a 
set of unelected judges. 
CONCLUSION: A CAUTIONARY NOTE 
I have described the multiple concurrent outlets for lawmaking in the 
current constitutional structure, and have advanced the proposition that this 
concurrency is a normative good. I now conclude with a reexamination of 
the judicial role in constructing and maintaining this concurrent structure. 
To a great extent the existing architecture is a construction of the Supreme 
Court’s doctrinal choices, particularly at the time of the New Deal when the 
Court similarly established other doctrines that facilitated robust ordinary 
lawmaking. The Court facilitated the expansion of ordinary law as part of 
an implicit compromise: it would support robust and diverse ordinary law-
making spaces, while at the same time embracing judicial supremacy in 
constitutional law. 
Just as the Supreme Court has permitted these multiple spaces to 
flourish, however, it possesses the doctrinal levers to truncate this multi-
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plicity and return the presumptive sweep of federal legislation to something 
closer to the latent exclusivity idea of a century ago. Federal statutes and 
agency regulations are both numerous enough and ambiguous enough to 
present many opportunities for judges to plausibly imply a kind of field 
preemption or exclusivity even where Congress has not spoken directly on 
the matter. Such broadening decisions have the potential to fundamentally 
alter the basic concurrent constitutional structure and foreclose a portion of 
the public’s current lawmaking space. Supreme Court decisions that speak 
to the preemptive scope of ordinary federal legislation are thus fundamen-
tally constitutional law decisions, though they are rarely labeled as such. 
To date, the Supreme Court has nominally not disavowed the doctrine 
of Rice, requiring that Congress must speak clearly and unequivocally to 
preempt state law in a given regulatory area. But a variety of recent cases 
suggests that the current Supreme Court is willing only halfheartedly to 
embrace the concurrency principle in all its potential messiness and multi-
plicity. In the past decade several doctrinal tendencies have emerged in 
various cases that possibly evidence a changing judicial outlook on concur-
rency. 
First, the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts has been a new-
found willingness to find implied preemption of state law based on the 
actions, statements, or even nonactions of administrative agencies. For 
instance, in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,56 a closely divided Court 
construed ambiguous language in a federal automobile safety statute as 
preempting a state tort lawsuit over airbag safety. The Court agreed that no 
clear evidence to preempt was apparent on the face of the statute Congress 
passed, but the Court inferred an implied preemption based on the decision 
of a federal agency not to move ahead with a new airbag standard. The 
analysis and result in Geier is a far cry from Rice’s clear statement rule, 
and a similar departure from the political theory underlying Rice—that the 
displacement of state law that preemption entails should typically only 
emanate from Congress, not from courts and administrative agencies. The 
Geier approach to preemption analysis has emboldened various agencies to 
consciously pursue new preemptive strategies and federal courts have ac-
cepted the agency arguments in favor of novel implied preemption ration-
ales.57 
 
 56. 529 U.S. 861, 874–75 (2000). 
 57. For instance, the FDA has adopted a new position that its approval of a medical device or drug 
in some instances preempts state common law suits. Numerous lower federal courts have agreed with 
the FDA and found preemption, despite the lack of a clear congressional statement to preempt state tort 
law. See Theodore Ruger, Left to Their Own Devices, LEGAL AFF., September/October 2005, at 24. 
[hereinafter Ruger, Own Devices]. 
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Other scholars have noticed this development, discerning in the Su-
preme Court’s preemption jurisprudence a “discernible trend toward feder-
alization . . . in the direction of national law for a national market.”58 In the 
2004 case of Aetna v. Davila, for instance, the Court broadly construed the 
preemption clause of ERISA to supersede state tort remedies against man-
aged care organizations for wrongful denial of benefits.59 In the Court’s 
recent cases, the textual command of a statute’s preemptive scope is rarely 
crystal clear, given Congress’s characteristic (and often strategic) ambigu-
ity in crafting preemption clauses and savings clauses in the same statutes. 
Against this backdrop of statutory uncertainty, the Court’s increasing will-
ingness to find preemption stands in contrast with the clear statement prin-
ciple of Rice, which articulated the assumption “that the historic police 
powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by [federal law] unless that 
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”60 And in departing from 
Rice’s presumption, the Court strays from the earlier era’s solicitude for the 
lawmaking choices made by the citizens of different states. There is a cost 
to such rulings in terms of popular involvement with important lawmaking 
choices that is independent of the substantive decisions in each case. 
Moreover, federal agencies appear to be listening to the Court’s new 
message on implied preemption, and modifying their own policymaking 
behavior in ways that give even greater force to this preemption trend. In a 
recent essay, Catherine Sharkey describes the manner in which some fed-
eral agencies are more aggressively asserting the preemptive force of their 
own regulations, positing a plausible near future “where federal agency 
regulations come armed with directives to displace competing or conflict-
ing state regulations or common law as a matter of course.”61 Agencies 
have also asserted broad preemption through methods less visible than 
proposed regulations. The federal Food and Drug Administration, for in-
stance, has recently advocated a new preemptive scope of its medical de-
vice approval decisions by strategic amicus intervention in private tort 
lawsuits. Through these amicus brief filings the agency has pressed its 
 
 58. Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization: Grappling with the 
“Risk to the Rest of the Country,” 53 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming Aug. 2006). See also Catherine M. 
Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Reform, 55 
DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) [hereinafter Sharkey, Preamble] (describing the Supreme Court as 
a “willing partner” in the “momentum towards increased preemption”). 
 59. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004); see also Theodore W. Ruger, The 
Supreme Court Federalizes Managed Care Liability, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 528 (2004). 
 60. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 61. Sharkey, Preamble, supra note 58. 
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broad preemption position, typically with a receptive audience in the lower 
federal courts.62 
The combination of these recent developments—federal agency asser-
tion of, and federal judicial acquiescence in, implied preemption claims—
places one significant feature of the New Deal compromise in jeopardy. 
The increased judicialization of much of constitutional law that occurred 
during the twentieth century was coupled with the Supreme Court’s expan-
sion of space for popular involvement in ordinary lawmaking. The Court’s 
recent decision in Gonzales v. Raich63 confirms that—despite hints to the 
contrary in Lopez and Morrison—the public’s ability through Congress to 
shape important policies at the national level under a capacious Commerce 
Clause remains virtually unlimited. But for the past half-century the Court 
has, through embracing the idea of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction, 
also protected alternative outlets for public involvement in policy formation 
in state legislatures and through state common law juries. To the extent the 
Court’s recent suggestions on implied preemption represent a new willing-
ness to opt for national uniformity even in the face of statutory ambiguity, 
this is a crucial new direction with potentially corrosive effects on the op-
portunities for popular lawmaking in the United States. 
 
 62. See Ruger, Own Devices, supra note 57. 
 63. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
